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Abstract
In this paper, we examine the economic factors that drive interdependence between credit
default swaps at a company level. First, we present estimates of network connectedness
(interdependence) between the credit default swaps for a sample of firms, including direc-
tional connectedness and overall connectedness. After analyzing the unconditional network
characteristics, we then include additional covariates and examine changes in the network
structure. Although an insurmountable number of events drive investors asset choices, we
focus on firm-, industry-, and macroeconomic- level events. We find that no single factor
explains connectedness in each sector. Additionally, the given factors, although they explain
sudden, volatile changes in net connectedness for sector returns and price volatility, do not
explain the general changes to net connectedness over time.
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1 Introduction
Collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) are a type of asset-backed security, which have con-
tinued to grow in popularity since the early 2000’s. First issued in 1987, the CDO is a
relatively new financial instrument; as such, it has not been deeply studied and is still an
area of undeveloped research. Contrary to equity instruments, a CDO is a fixed-income
instrument, which assembles cash flows of names into layered groups of risk. These groups,
known as tranches, act to lower risk through diversification of debt. CDOs provide numerous
benefits besides lower risk, such as the ability to convert debt into capital, provide a larger
market for fixed income investment, and offer a higher return of investment. With these
attractive options, the CDO market grew from 69 billion in 2000 to 500 billion in 2006, a
620% increase. This growth continued until the 2007 sub-prime mortgage crisis, which was
shortly followed by the 2008 global recession.
Credit derivatives are of particular interest due to the recent credit crises, a period with
low issuance of credit. Usually, a credit crisis is a tightening of loans due to high failure in
the credit market. Due to the difficulty in acquiring data on credit derivatives, indices are
commonly used as a proxy for the market. The market share of these instruments varies over
time, but consistently composes a majority. As such, they act as a well-fitted representation
in order to study the events which cause high failure. By understanding the factors that
drive this connectedness, the groundwork is laid for developing models which aim to predict,
and possibly prevent, credit crises.
As with many financial assets, credit derivatives are part of a network, an intuitive
representation of the connections that are formed by the actions and reactions that take
place in the market, where investors are constantly acting and reacting to new information.
Connectedness represents an investor’s expectations, as part of their evaluation of individual
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asset risk and overall portfolio risk. That is, these expectations of risk are partially a function
of connectedness. This approach does not aim to calculate an individual investor’s risk, but
instead the network formed by many such individuals. As such, networks are the result
of the aggregate of investors’ expectations. Take, for example, news that a financial firm
with a credit default swap may crash. When an investor hears this news, he/she takes into
consideration the risk of his/her portfolio, including a consideration of how this crash may
affect other assets. Right away, we can see this consideration has formed a network of the
original firm’s CDS to other assets.
This contributes to a growing body of literature that applies networks to economics.
Networks are not exclusive in financial markets or even economics, as they are applicable,
but not limited to, game theory, evolutionary biology, and social media. However, their
study and development is new to the field of economics, so difficulty arises in constructing
a network, as it has no inherent measure that can be gathered by studying investors. By
adding in a large data set of events, the connectedness measure is further developed as a
tool for understanding the network, despite its open-ended interpretation. We start with an
approach discussed in Diebold and Yilmaz (2015a) of connectedness being part of credit risk
and portfolio choice before expanding further to event studies. We find that each sector has
specific factors which affect it, with some factors being unique to the sector. Additionally,
returns are sensitive to firm specific factors, while volatilities are sensitive to some firm
specific factors and macroeconomic factors.
The remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 1 gives an introduction to credit
derivatives, networks, and connectedness. Section 2 provides more background on credit
derivatives and available data. Next, Section 3 gives an overview of the literature, both
on credit derivatives, network theory, and estimation of networks. Section 4 discusses the
theoretical model following a modified Modern Portfolio Theory that includes connectedness
as an input for investors risk expectation. Section 5 starts by detailing the construction
of the Diebold-Yilmaz index in a simple case, before transitioning to the general measure.
4
Section 6 presents the empirical model. Section 7 provides information on the data. Section
9 concludes the paper and reviews results and contributions.
2 Background
Before examining the role of CDOs in crises and the tools used to evaluate their risk, we
must first understand their operation. A CDO begins when a special purpose vehicle (SPV),
a specialized legal entity, aggregates the names1 into a CDO. Each tranche from this aggre-
gation process is given a rating by common credit rating agencies. Unlike stocks or bonds,
CDOs do not have a direct market where investors post bids and asks. Instead, they are
a contractual obligation between an issuer and an investor developed through a series of
private communications. Cash flows of principal and interest payments are directed into the
tranches in order of decreasing seniority, with the highest senior tranche having the least
risk. As a result, coupon payments are inversely related to tranche seniority. Let us take,
for example, a CDO sliced into six tranches. The highest tranche is known as a “senior” or
“super senior,” whereas the lower tranches are “junior” or “mezzanine.” The lowest tranche
of all is called an “equity” tranche, and it has the highest risk of loss. Each tranche has a
percent spread of N-M percent, where N is known as the “attachment point” and M as the
“detachment point.” For the purposes of this example, we will assign the tranches, in order
of increasing seniority, 0-3, 3-7, 7-10, 10-15, 15-30, 30-100 percent. If a name defaults, the
equity tranche will absorb all losses up to 3 percent of the total notional value (detachment
point). This absorption will continue up the rank of seniority until the senior tranche stops
receiving cash flows. When credit losses exceed the percent of the tranche, the entire amount
for the investor is eliminated, and the investor loses his/her principal, and coupon payments
will cease.
Among other fixed-income instruments are the credit default swap (CDS) and synthetic
CDO (SCDO). A credit default swap is a contract, in which a buyer makes a payment to an
1A name is any asset where an investor can take a position on its default
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insurer for some fixed amount of time. The remaining principal is paid to the buyer by the
insurer if the debtor defaults. In this way, the underlying asset(s) is insured against default
by a credit default swap. Once the CDS contracts are defined, an SPV can create a synthetic
CDO. A synthetic CDO is similar to a CDO, except the underlying assets are credit default
swaps.
With the financial instruments underlying this study well defined, we can now discuss
the issues of data and use of indices. First, data on collateralized debt obligation are quite
hard to procure. As there is no market, pricing information is hidden in contracts and com-
munications between investors and issuers. The underlying names, which are of particular
interest, are so vast, that investors do not know their specifications. Rather, only the rat-
ing information is known to them. For these reasons, several indices have been created to
monitor and study the market indirectly. In this study, we use the CDX North American
Investment Grade Index and the CDX North American High Yield Index. Both indices fea-
ture the top 125 liquid companies on a rolling six-month basis. These two indices are also
of particular interest as they have index CDO tranches issued, tie to the CDX index. As
opposed to CDOs, these CDX.HY and CDX.IG indices function as synthetic collateralized
debt obligations. Despite this, they function well as a proxy for the credit market. Several
studies have found that the ratio of risk premium to the credit risk component is constant
(Pan and Singleton 2008, and Longstaff et al. 2011). Given this analysis only takes into
account the ordinal properties of the connectedness estimation, there are no issues with the
use of spreads as proxies.
3 Literature Review
We begin by reviewing literature on CDOs, which is strongly focused on pricing models.
In addition to establishing groundwork for the model in this paper, this review aims to
demonstrate the deficit in studies focusing on other aspects of CDOs. The pricing of CDOs
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began when Li (2000) introduced a pricing model using a copula coefficient, which grew
rapidly in popularity among financial markets. However, the incorrect use of this model
has been cited as a major contributor of the sub-prime mortgage crisis (Duffie, Saita, and
Wang 2007). In terms of a network, the underlying connectedness of CDOs begins in the
pricing model, which takes into account a copula coefficient2. Many investment banks now
focus heavily on developing better models for the credit market, which differ heavily from the
equity market in terms of accuracy and depth of knowledge. For studying the effect of events,
in an aim to predict prices, Longstaff and Rajan (2008) examined a three-factor model, each
factor being a firm failure, failure of multiple firms, or wide scale failure. Although they found
that multiple factors were needed to better account for pricing using a Poisson process, they
also found the current market to be efficient in its pricing of overall portfolios.
More recently, literature has transitioned beyond pricing, examining the connectedness
of sovereign CDOs and CDOs to other markets. Bostanci and Yilmaz (2015) applied the
Diebold-Yilmaz connectedness index to sovereign credit default swaps for 38 countries be-
tween 2009 and 2014. They found two clusters of indices, composed of developed and devel-
oping countries. Within this, they determined emerging market countries were the dominant
factor in sovereign credit risk shocks, while developed countries displayed less risk. Addition-
ally, Fonseca and Gottschalk (2012) applied the Diebold-Yilmaz measure to firm-level CDS
data from Asia-Pacific Markets, analyzing the relation between stocks and CDS spreads.
They determined a discrepancy exists between the implied volatility at firm-level and the
realized volatility at market-level.
Lastly, we discuss the factors which can affect the underlying default probability. Al-
though credit ratings agencies attempted to undertake this task, they largely failed to include
a national default probability. Most agencies believed the diversification by location low-
ered risk, as geographic isolation would contain crises to the sub-network. Connectedness
is largely a result of investors’ expectations and risk behaviors (Bostanci and Yilmaz 2015).
2a copula is a multivariate probability distribution for which the marginal probability of each variable is
one form
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As a result, factors, both observed and unobserved, affect connectedness. Thus far, the lit-
erature has examined a few particular events, such as Bernanke’s speech during the financial
crisis (Bostanci and Yilmaz 2015).
4 Theoretical Setup
We follow Modern Portfolio Theory (Markowitz 1952). We begin with a single period model,
where an investor considers available credit default swaps available before making his/her
investment decision, beginning with an expectation of risk. As a credit default swap is a
contract, the market is less volatile, meaning an investor cannot trade assets as easily. In this
sense, this greatly reduces the need for a multi-period model, as investor need not re-evaluate
his/her position often.
We now consider a multi-period model, where the investor is able to again invest, due
to more cash flows. Now, the network expectation is subject to change the impact of an
event on an investor. As these markets are traded at high volumes, most investors are
professional, meaning they have constant access to information. When an event occurs, an
investor compares his/her expectation of the network to the current realization, and then
changes his/her position depending on the difference between his/her expectation and the
realization.
Let us denote the expected network as E(O). Let the expectation of risk be E(Ri) =
f(E(O), oi), where oi are other factors. An investor places weight wi on each asset as a split
of his/her portfolio, where
∑n












where ψ is the standard deviation for the periodic returns of the asset, and ρij is the






Investors then choose a budget set B(p, f), given available funds f as:
B(p, f) = {x ∈ Rn+ : p · x ≤ f}, (4.3)
where p is the price vector for the CDS’s and x is an vector of volumes for the CDS’s.
Given limited funds f, an investor chooses to invest in CDSs which fit his/her expectation
of return. An investor considers both return volatility and expected risk when making an
investment decision. Our main conclusion of this model is investors examine the given
information and form an expected value of risk. When an exogenous shock occurs, investors
change his/her expectation of risk. As such, the connectedness between CDOs for each
company changes, affecting the overall network structure.
5 Connectedness
5.1 Network Theory and Analysis
A network N is a collection of N nodes (or vertices) and L edges. Intuitively, a network
represents relationships between these objects (nodes) as edges. A network can be directed,
meaning each pair of nodes can have at most 2 edges between them, or undirected, meaning
two nodes share a single edge. Mathematically, a network is an adjacency matrix A = [aij],
where aij represents the edge from node i to node j. In an unweighted network, aij = 0
or 1, with 0 being no relationship and 1 being a relationship. These types of networks are
common in sociology, such as when studying social networks. In many economic applications,
we would like to use directional, weighted networks, as we believe a set of nodes (such as
stocks) have a relationship we would like to represent in a directed, numerically ordered
manner.
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Network Theory is a relatively new area of study and tools to understand networks are
still being developed. We begin with the connectedness table (Table 11.1), where the entries
from x1 to xN are analogous to the transpose adjacent matrix.
In estimating networks using variance decompositions, as discussed in the next section,
we form N2 edge weights, where entry θij(H) gives the connectedness from node j to node
i. Networks are often large, dense datasets, which make gleaning useful information an
impossible task. We can use several methodologies to gain useful information about a net-
work, starting with net connectedness. For a pair of nodes i, j we define pairwise directional
connectedness as
CHi←j = θij(H)
As Diebold and Yilmaz note, it is not necessarily true that CHi←j = CHj←i, so there are




Calculating the pairwise connectedness for all pairs allows a great degree of combinations
for analysis. In similar convention, we examine to connectedness and from connectedness. To
connectedness is the effect of a CDS i to the system, which is high-yield and investment grade
CDSs. From connectedness is the effect of the system to a CDS i of either index (we provide
detailed calculations of connectedness in the following section). We can also calculate total













Differencing these two total measures gives us net total directional connectedness, which we
will from here on refer to as just net connectedness, defined as:
CHi = C
H•← i − CHi←• (5.3)
Another aspect of interest in networks is communities, which are groups of nodes that are
more densely connected among each other than other nodes. In this paper, we use the
Louvain Method to detect communities (Blondel et al. 2008). This method has been used
before with the Diebold-Yilmaz Connectedness Measure in Bostanci and Yilmaz (2015).
The Louvain Method is an iterative process that maximizes modularity, a metric which
measures how much more dense the detected community connections are compared to a
random network. After detecting communities, we can examine which nodes (in this paper,
companies or sectors) belong to the communities and the underlying features which drive
their modularity.
5.2 Diebold-Yilmaz Connectedness Measure
We begin with N -dimensional VAR(p) model,
Yt = Φ1Yt−1 + . . .+ΦpYt−p + εt (5.4)
where ε is white noise and Φ1, . . . ,Φp are coefficient matrices. Given the VAR(p)
process is causal and invertible, we can transform it to a MA(∞) representation Yt =
εt + A1εt−1 + A2εt−2 + . . . with N × N matrices Ah. Now for a H-step ahead forecast
at time t, P (Yt+h|Yt, Yt−1, . . .) and for the corresponding forecast error
Yt+H − P (Yt+h|Yt, Yt−1, . . .) = εt+H +A1εt+H−1 +A2εt+H−2 + . . .+AH−1εt+1 (5.5)





Σε denoting the covariance matrix of ε.
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5.2.1 Cholesky Decomposition
We make use of the lower-triangular Cholesky factor L of Σε, i.e. the lower-triangular matrix
L with LL′ = Σε to decompose the forecast error variances. Using L, AhΣεA′h can be









ij may be considered as the contribution
of (shocks to) variable j to variable i’s forecast error variance
5.2.2 Generalized Variance Decomposition
Cholesky decompositions are sensitive to ordering, so we may be reluctant to impose identi-
fying assumptions; there are several ways to combat this sensitivity. One way, as in Diebold
and Yilmaz (2009) is to take random permutations before the rotation and find the average,
minimum, and maximum across these permutations. However, this was shown in Klößner
and Wagner (2014) to underestimate the spillover index by up to a third.345 Additionally,
we can use generalized variance decompositions, which avoids using a rotation matrix, and
thus does not impose identifying assumptions (although it has assumptions of its own). Gen-
eralized variance decomposition (GVD) was introduced in Koop et al. (1996) and Pesaran
and Shin (1998). To calculate it, we first measure pairwise directional connectedness, which
measures the effect of company i on company j. This H-step-ahead generalized forecast














where σ−1jj is the inverse of the standard deviation of the error term for the jth equation,
and δi is a selection vector with one as the ith element and zeros otherwise Bostanci and
3Klößner and Wagner (2014) resolve this by using a permutation matrix in optimization problems,
along with a “divide and conquer” strategy, that allows us to explore all VAR orderings of the Cholesky
decomposition
4Their algorithm is available for R in the CRAN repository under “fastSOM”
5We utilize their algorithm in calculating the spillover index and tabular values under a Cholesky de-
composition, unless otherwise noted.
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ij(H) = 1, given by construction. We follow the con-
vention of referring to θ̃gij(H) as θ
g
ij(H) after normalizing, which is the pairwise connectedness
from variable j to variable i.
5.2.3 Spillover Index
The spillover index is a single measure which measures the total connectedness between all
different pairs of assets (that is, except self-connectedness). We then define the spillover








5.2.4 Dynamic Analysis Methodology
The methodology discussed thus far is useful for giving a static view of connectedness, but
a dynamic view is also of great interest. By employing a rolling window, we can view the
connectedness up to the end of a window. Doing this over a series of several windows forms




We use the CDX index, which is a daily price index for synthetic CDOs. The CDX index is
distributed by Markit, a company which aggregates and parses CDS contracts into pricing
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data, and accessible at a number of financial data vendors. The series is rolled over every
six months, where a dealer poll is used to drop illiquid firms. Markit makes these changes
publicly available. Additionally, if a credit event occurs, the price index is stopped, re-
evaluated, and started with a new combination of firms. A credit event is defined by the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) as a bankruptcy, failure to pay,
debt restructuring, or an obligation default/acceleration.
We aggregate data from 2003 to 2017 for all available companies. Since the market can be
illiquid, we follow Bostanci and Yilmaz (2015) and impute missing days for up to 8 trading
days. From here, we then calculate all available continuous series. Since the financial crisis
is of particular interest, we then restrict the possible ranges such that they occur before 2006
and after 2010. After these restrictions, there are still several contiguous runs available, with
a trade-off between the length of a run and the number of companies in a run. To make the
choice of the run simple, we choose the run with the most companies.
In Table 11.2, we see the mean of the Offer is above the mean of the Ask, meaning
investors who are attempting to sell the CDS value it above investors who are attempting
to buy them. Additionally, the Last price of the spreads (given in bps) are well varied, so
that when they are used to calculate returns, there is enough variance in the data for our
regression.
6.1.1 Returns and Volatility
We use the daily difference of log spreads, as in Bostanci and Yilmaz (2015), which has
several benefits. Log normal returns allow us to normalize to a common unit (returns)
across different pricing units, as not all credit default swaps are traded in bps. Given that
the price of a CDS is normally distributed, then log(1 + ri), where ri is the daily return for
given company i, is also normally distributed.
For estimating volatility, we use the method by Yang and Zhang (2000), which can handle
overnight jumps and non-zero drift. We follow Yang and Zhang (2000) by keeping with the
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notation introduced by Garman and Klass (1980). Let f ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of the period
that trading is closed, C0 be the closing price of the previous period (at time 0), O1 be the
opening price of the current period (at time f), H1 be the current period’s high during the
trading interval (between [f, 1]), L1 be the current period’s low during the trading interval
(between [f, 1]), and C1 be the closing price of the current period (at time 1). The variance
(square of volatility) estimator is given by:























[ui(ui − ci) + di(di + ci)]
where k is a constant chosen such that it minimizes the variance of the estimator V , T is the
time period, n is the number of periods (in our case, n = 191, which results in k = 0.144),









i=1 ci. Finally, T = 12, which is the number of non-overlapping bins of size n = 191
in the sample.
6.2 News Measure
We capture news data on all firms available from accessible news sources to test whether
these events have an impact on connectedness. News data is from RavenPack Analytics
[Dow Jones Edition], a company which parses and categorizes news articles and press re-
15
leases.6 The database contains over 119 million observations of news releases from DowJones
sources (Dow Jones Newswires, regional editions of the Wall Street Journal, Barron’s and
MarketWatch) at the milisecond level, along with the corresponding International Securi-
ties Identification Number (ISIN), a company identification code, for the topical company,
sentiment analysis, and categorization into progressively finer topic levels. To transform
this database we begin with the second coarsest level (Group) of categorization, which is
composed of 51 possible different topics (not all topics appear in our sample, however). For
the company-level analysis, we form a topical index for each company. Additionally, for
sector-level analysis, we form a revenue weighted index for all available companies.
6.2.1 Company Level
We wish to construct an index for each company across the different news types. This index
is denoted Fi,j,t, meaning the index for company i concerning topic j at time t. In order to
construct an index for company-level events, we begin with Ii,j,l,t an indicator function for
an event, defined as
Ii,j,l,t =

1 if the lth news release about topic j for company i occured at time t
0 otherwise
(6.2)
To then aggregate these indicators to a single measure, we sum Ii,j,t across each day and










where N is the total number of events for topic j and company i at time t. In sum, we
have constructed an index between 0 and 1 which indicates how much news activity there




We construct a basic sector-level news measure by aggregating the sum of the company-level
news indicator across each sector. Let S = {S1,S2, . . . ,Sm−1,Sm−2, . . . ,Sq} be the set of
sectors, where Sm = {χ1, χ2, . . . , χM} for and M ≤ N , such that Si ∩ Sj = ∅ for all i 6= j,
and where χ is the vector of companies. Thus, the basic sector level news measure Fm for





For the sector level data, we include news data of companies outside the sample of those
with credit default swaps. In this model, companies without credit default swaps can still
affect those that do have CDS’s. Additionally, we expect some companies to play a more
vital role in representing the stability (or instability) of a sector. These adjusted sector-level
mews measures, denoted F̃, are the sum of the indicator measure for all companies in the
sector, each company would be given equal weight in changing the index. To represent the
impact a company has on a sector, we use revenue data from Institutional Brokers’ Estimate
System (I/B/E/S).7 We take the sum of total revenue in the sector and use a company’s






where Ri,t is the revenue for company i at time t.
6.3 Macroeconomic Data
Our remaining data includes macroeconomic covariates, denoted by the 9 × 1 vector W ,
which includes: 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate, Civilian Unemployment Rate,
7Although I/B/E/S is commonly used to evaluate analyst positions on measures of company performance,
such as revenue, employment, etc., it also contains actual quarterly values for each company
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Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers, Effective Federal Funds Rate, Quarterly
Seasonally Adjusted Gross Domestic Product, Real Median Household Income in the United
States, Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index, University of Michigan: Consumer Sentiment,
and University of Michigan: Inflation Expectation. All data are from Federal Reserve Eco-
nomic Data (FRED) which are observed from 2007 to 2013. There are a few important
aspects to note. First, except for both of the Michigan covariates (which are monthly),
the macroeconomic covariates are quarterly, while our financial data is daily (trading days).
Given several years of data, there is enough variation in the macroeconomic variables to
make the regression meaningful. Second, the macroeconomic variables are the value for the
prior quarter, so we use these to represent economic activity for each day. Additionally,
the quarterly macroeconomic covariates act as controls for the economic climate, as well as
other unseen factors not included in the news measure. Third, given the high frequency of
the University of Michigan covariates (Consumer Sentiment and Inflation Expectation) do
represent the quite likely expected value by consumers at the time of observation. We make
the simlifying assumption that the investors for which we observe financial data are the same
(of the same type) as the consumer forming expectations in these surveys. In this way, these
two covariates do represent investor knowledge (expectation) at the time.
7 Empirical Model
7.1 Company Level





Ahyt−h + εt (7.1)
where yt is a 89× 1 vector of returns or estimated volatilities for 89 companies at time t
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and Ah’s are 89× 89 coefficient matrices.
7.2 Sector Level
With 89 companies and a third order VAR, we would have 264 independent variables on
the right-hand side. If we wished to include the company news measure F as a covariate,
the regression becomes non-singular. We could impose identifying assumptions to reduce
the number of covariates at the company level, but this still causes issues with non-singular
matrix when estimating the coefficients. We resolve the issue of high-dimensionality by using
principal component analysis (PCA) to view sector connectedness. Each credit default swap
is grouped by its sector and PCA is then applied by group. For each of these PCAs, we
use the first principal component when forming the new VAR, denoting the vector of first
principal components as z. The use of PCA follows intuitively, as it explains the greatest
source of variance in the forecast error, which the index is meant to capture. Thus, we are
able to gain a strong and accurate view of connectedness, without dealing with the issues
high-dimensional analysis. We will discuss the specifics of the industries in the data and
results section. PCA thus allows us an easier network to interpret; instead of having to
view 89 nodes and their 89 × 2 = 178 edge weights, we are limited to 10 to 20 nodes and
their 20-40 edges, which is much more manageable. On the other hand, we lose information
on connectedness of specific companies, preventing us from viewing company-level spillovers
and changes in its network over time.




Ahzt−h + ΛF̃t + ΞWt + εt (7.2)
where zt is a 11× 1 vector of returns or estimated volatilities for 11 sectors at time t, the
Ah’s are 11×11 coefficient matrices, the news measure is F̃, and macroeconomic variables are
W , with covariate matrices Λ and Ξ, respectively. Additionally, Λ is a 11×dim(F̃ ) coefficient
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matrix and Dt is a dim(F̃ )×1 matrix of dim(F̃ ) vectors at time t, where dim(F̃ ) is the total
number of news covariates (the column size of F̃). Now, each endogenous variable yi|t, for
i = 1, . . . , K, has dim(F̃ ) exogenous variables, meaning the dim(F̃ ) variables are specific to
company i. Lastly, Ξ is a K × dim(W ) coefficient matrix for the macroeconomic covariates
W .
We now discuss our identifying assumptions on the coefficient matrix Λ, imposing struc-
ture so that Λij = 0 for j /∈ {dim(F̃)·(i−1)+1, dim(F̃)·(i−1)+2, . . . , dim(F̃)·(i−1)+dim(F̃)},
where F̃m are the factors specific to sector m. However, we do not impose any structure
on the Ah’s or Ξ. In other words, factors for a company only affect that specific company
directly, but macroeconomic variables and lags of the price affect all zm,t. This is not to say
that factors for other companies do not have some effect on a particular company. Instead,
these factors first affect the price (and therefore the returns or volatility) for the correspond-
ing company, which then affects all other companies through its lag. In this way, there is a
delayed response from investors reacting to shocks; investors spend time learning and evalu-
ating the possible impacts of some shocks. Of course, the delay of the investors reaction may
range widely amongst investors, so there is some importance in the unit t. A large t, such
as a year, would imply a long, delayed reaction by the market in response to these shocks.
As our unit is daily, we assume the market takes at least a day to react to shocks.
The inclusion of the news measure covariates and macroeconomic covariates allows us to
test for their significance in the VAR equation for sector returns and sector price volatility
(from our PCA analysis). After determine which covariates are significant, we can then
observe changes in the network. These results could be important for policy makers at
all levels, as they allow us to distinguish, given the right conditions, how particular events
underly connectedness. For example, if we see a change in net connectedness for Basic
Industries when including news for Regulation in the VAR, supposing that it is the only
news at that time, then a policy maker could determine how further news on regulation
would result in spillovers. This application is possible at all levels, from monetary policy at
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the Federal level to regulation at a state or even city level, depending on what connectedness
we are examining.
8 Results
We begin by viewing static network plots for both company returns and price volatilities.
As in Diebold and Yilmaz 2015a, we use Gephi, a program for network plots and analysis,
to graph the networks8. For all network graphs (including those later in this paper), we
use ForceAtlas2, a node position algorithm which uses edge weights as a gravitational force.
Using the company-level results as motivation for aggregation, we then transition to a dis-
cussion of sector-level results. After analyzing the static sector-level networks for returns
and price volatilities, we employ a rolling window to view changes in sector connectedness
over time. We then view results starting at the spillover index and proceeding down to more
detailed results. As it is impractical to view the thousands of networks given by our rolling
window analyses, we aggregate the sector connectedness measures to net connectedness of
each sector. Lastly, we conclude with a robustness check to view the sensitivity of our results
to the rolling window size and H-step ahead error.
8.1 Static (Full-Sample, Unconditional) Company Level Results
Our analysis begins in Figure 11.3, which is a network of company returns. The network
is symmetrically connected for all companies, as it has a circular shape, indicating equal
opposing and attractive forces. There are a few noticeable exceptions, such as the strong
link between two blue nodes at the bottom of the graph, which are Campbell Food and
General Mills, both in the Consumer Non-Durables sector. We note that these companies
are in the same sector, which follows our intuition that companies in the same sector are more
highly connected. Since shocks that affect a sector are propagated throughout all companies
8Bastian, Heymann, and Jacomy (2009)
21
in the sector, the residuals are strongly correlated, and thus their edge weight is stronger.
Additionally, we plot a network for company price volatility. As opposed to company
returns, this network has more sparse regions along the outer edge. There still exists a strong
centrality to the shape of the network, indicating equal opposing and attractive forces.
Many of the companies in the same community, such as the orange in the bottom right,
belong to the same sector. From the differing network shape, we infer that shocks affect
volatility differently than returns or that the shocks themselves are different. In this way,
price volatility is more sensitive to shocks, which follows intuition as investors are making
changes throughout the trading day based on new information.
8.2 Static (Full-Sample, Unconditional) Sector Level Results
In Figure 11.5, we see the distribution of communities among each sector. We note for many
of the return networks, there is a strongly dominant community. While volatility also has
a dominant community, there exist smaller communities in a sector. The return network is
less sensitive to shocks that affect all sectors, while price volatility network is more sensitive
to shocks that affect all sectors.
We begin this section with a static network of sector returns from our PCA analysis in
Figure 11.6. Now, we can distinguish interesting features of the network. For example, we
observe that Technology is connected to many sectors, while not many sectors are connected
to it. For example, in the center, we have a group of heavily connected sectors: Public
Utilities, Consumer Non-Durables, Consumer Services, and Capital Goods. These central
sectors all provide goods or services direct to households, while there are intermediary sectors
between the outer edge networks. We expect the shocks to these sectors are common, such as
changes in retail tax law (which would affect the aforementioned sectors), while not affecting
other networks.
In Figure 11.7, we plot the network of price volatilities. We see that Consumer Durables,
Consumer Non-Durables, Energy, Technology, Finance, and Consumer Services are not as
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heavily connected as those in the center. Note the strong link between of Energy to Public
Utilities and Consumer Non-Durables, which would follow as Energy is reliant on these
sectors. Consumer Services, in particular, is far from many of the other sectors, indicating
it is independent of shocks from all other sectors. Detecting communities as before, we note
two communities, one of which contains Consumer Non-Durables, Energy, and Finance. This
community has a common attribute of being fast-moving, meaning there is high quantity
demanded and volatile changes are made to supply. The other community experiences a
more consistent level of demand and is thus sensitive to different shocks.
8.3 Dynamic (Rolling-Sample, Conditional) Sector Level Results
Since we are motivated to aggregate the data to a sector level in order to lower the dimen-
sionality, we focus solely on sector level results for dynamic analysis, for which we use a
window size of 500 and an 12-step ahead error. We examine different network measures,
starting from the broad view of the spillover index to the micro view of net connectedness by
sector. In these analyses, we look at the changes before and after the addition of covariates
and examine the determining factors.
We begin with the spillover index in Figure 11.8. For the index, we observe an increase in
the average index around 2008, at the beginning of the financial crisis. Although the index
begins to decline thereafter, it does not reach its previous levels. A sudden change occurs
around 2010 that normalizes thereafter. This coincides with the standardization of credit
default swaps, increasing their liquidity that, combined with a re-acceptance as a valuable
finance instrument, renewed their growth. Throughout our analyses, we will see this trend in
various measures. Hereafter, this event is referred to as the “CDS big bang’’ or “big bang.’’
as deemed in the previous literature. In checking the robustness of our ordering for the
Cholesky based index, the minimum and maximum do not differ strongly from the average.
This follows our analyses thus far that returns are not sensitive to different changes, such as
shocks to other sectors or the ordering identification for Cholesky decomposition. Returns,
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then, are strongly based on the returns previous sector itself and not other sectors. For
the GVD based spillover index, the estimate tends to be higher than the maximum of the
Cholesky decomposition. Also, the connectedness measure is higher under GVD, as found
in Klößner and Wagner (2014).
In Figure 11.9 we plot the spillover index for price volatility. Around 2008, we see a sharp
increase in the spillover index, around the time of the financial crisis. We also see the advent
of the big bang around mid-2010, with a return to normalcy thereafter. Exploring our various
orderings and decompositions, we see the maximum and minimum for the Cholesky based
index has a broad range, so price volatility is sensitive to the Cholesky ordering. We expect
there exist more common factors between these sectors than with returns. The GVD based
index is higher than the maximum of the Cholesky based index, save for a few exceptions.
We further collapse the data to net connectedness, as detailed in the connectedness sec-
tion, to allow us to see changes to the network over time. This transformation provides a
compact view of connectedness dynamics, allowing us to see the effect of the inclusion of
our covariates. First, we examine the sensitivity of the net connectedness measure to the
Cholesky ordering. For further analyses, we focus on the average net connectedness across
10,000 random permutations. While we lose information on the connectedness between sec-
tors, we still can glean the spillover of one sector towards all others and all others to that
sector.
Beginning with Figure 11.10, we explore the average, minimum, and maximum values
of net sector connectedness across 10,000 random orderings. For certain permutations, not
necessarily the same, we see there is a sharp decrease in the minimum starting in 2008 for all
sectors. Additionally, the range of the minimum is greater than the range of the maximum
for all sectors. For these orderings, the to connectedness exceeds from connectedness, as
the Cholesky ordering imposes the assumption that all other sectors affect the first sector
the strongest. Since the range of the minimum is far from the average, we exclude it in
further analyses and focus on the average value. Although excluded from this paper, the
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maximum and minimum values for the net connectedness measures have similar features to
Figure 11.10.
In 11.11, we better observe the overall changes in sector return net connectedness. Around
2008, there is a sharp decrease in net connectedness in finance, for example, which aligns
with the financial crisis. Conversely, we see increases in net connectedness within Energy,
Health Care, and Public Utilities. So, shocks to Finance, Energy, Health Care, and Public
Utilities explained the returns for one another more strongly during this period. We see a
notable changes around 2010, which we attribute to the big bang, which is followed by a
return to normalcy.
We can see the effect of including covariates in Figure 11.12. Overall, many of the
abrupt changes in net connectedness are lessened when covariates are added. For example,
the sharp decrease for Finance in 2008 is lessened. However, long-run trends, such as the
slower decrease in Technology around 2010, are increased. In other words, knowledge of
these events lessens the impact to net connectedness for sudden changes, but increases the
impact of changes over a longer run. If the long-run trend is due to the big bang, including
covariates would strengthen it due to a stronger correlation among the errors, as the big
bang underlies all sectors.
For sector price volatility, we observe sector net connectedness before the inclusion of
covariates in Figure 11.13. For many sectors, such as Basic Industries, the net connectedness
measure is around 0, indicating equal to connectedness and from connectedness. There are
notable exceptions, such as Energy, with experiences sharp dips and increases. We expect,
then, that energy shares covariates with other sectors the most out of the other sector
covariates. With our identifying assumptions, we are restricted to these shared covariates
being macroeconomic factors, as sector-specific factors cannot be shared (i.e. Energy analyst
ratings cannot affect Consumer Durables volatility, by our assumption).
Introducing covariates to the volatility VAR in Figure 11.14, we see the overall affect is
an increase in volatility of the average net connected measure. For example, the decrease
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in the average around 2008 for Energy is lower than the average for sector volatility net
connectedness without covariates. Including investor knowledge and macroeconomic climate
causes errors to be more highly correlated and thus spillovers increase. If net connectedness
is becoming more volatile, that means that from connectedness and to connectedness are
also volatile. As from connectedness sums to unity, the spillovers must be transferring to
other sectors or from other sectors for a specific sector if there is a change in net connect-
edness. In conclusion, including covariates for price volatility increases the volatility of net
connectedness for each sector.
We transition to discussion of significant covariates in Table 11.4. For the return VARs,
we see that news items compose most of the significant covariates, whereas macroeconomic
covariates are not significant. We see that sectors that had strong connections share common
covariates, such as news about Insider Trading among Basic Industries, Capital Goods,
Consumer Services, and Energy. As these coefficients were originally in the residuals, and are
of the same sign, we have reduced the residual and thus changed the underlying connectedness
estimation. Additionally, we observe there are factors unique to some sectors, such as Price
Targets news for Consumer Services or War Conflict news for Transportation As these factors
were not common in all the residuals, the underlying connectedness measure changes in a
different way. Overall, we see many different factors are significant and thus have changed
the residuals and reduced the sum of squared residuals.
In the next column, we observe significant covariates for sector volatilities. The most
frequently occurring covariates are macroeconomic. Thus, the volatility of the price caused
by changes in investor preference is caused by the economic climate and macroeconomic
investor expectations. We do see some News Items, but these are less frequent. Those News
Items that are significant for volatility are not significant for returns, indicating different
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dynamics drive volatilities and returns.
9 Robustness
We sample spillover indices and net connectedness for select sectors to examine the effects of
changing the window size and H-step ahead error. Changes in the window size indicates the
strength of past factors on the current connectedness measure. For example, a large window
size indicates factors (such as returns) further in the past affect returns in the future. We
also examine changes in the H-step ahead error. We examined the robustness of each sector
and select the sector which is affected most these changes. For net connectedness of returns
without covariates, we examine the robustness of Basic Industries. Additionally, for net
connectedness of price volatility with covariates, we examine the robustness of Energy.
In Figure 11.15, as window size increases, we lose finer details on changes in connected-
ness: a larger window means means larger samples, making a rolling window (by adding and
dropping one observation at time) have less changes in the regression overall. This is not
necessarily a detriment, as we expect there to be some appropriate window size which rep-
resents the extent of investors consideration to the past. Additionally, for changes in H-step
ahead error, we see there do not exist detectable changes to the spillover index. Our baseline
index is 12-step ahead, 500 day window size, which we compare among the other sizes. We
see that despite changes in the H-step and window size, the our choice still captures the
overall trends present in all facets, save for some minor fluctuations
Next, we examine Basic Industries returns without covariates (from PCA) and examine
its robustness in Figure 11.16. We see, again, that a larger window size decreases the
magnitude of the net connectedness measure. As the step ahead error size increases, the
magnitude increases as well. Overall, the general trends remain the same among window size
and H-step ahead error. As we are not assigning a quantitative measure to these changes and
instead examining the increases and decreases in net connectedness, the net connectedness
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measure is robust. For our default window size and H-step, we see, comparatively, there
is a different in the rise of net connectedness around 2011, with our baseline being a minor
increase. Still, we find the overall trend follows throughout each facet.
Lastly, we select Energy price volatility with covariates in Figure 11.17. We see as
window size increases, magnitude decreases, as expected. Additionally, as H-step ahead error
increases, the magnitude increases. Even with the smallest magnitude across our window
size is 200 and 6-step errors at, we still see a notable drop in net connectedness around 2008.
Thus the trends we detect throughout our analyses are apparent despite changes in window
size and H-step ahead error. Our choices find an appropriate middle ground that still covers
sudden changes, such as the dramatic decrease around 2008, with the value not being as
extreme as for a window size of 150 and 12-step ahead.
10 Conclusion
We use the Diebold-Yilmaz connectedness measure to study the spillovers between 89 com-
pany credit default swaps over the period of 2007 to 2013. In order to make interpretation
more manageable, we use Principal Component Analysis to reduce the dimensionality of
company prices to a sector-level. We include news and macroeconomic covariates in the un-
derlying VAR for returns and examine the changes in net connectedness before and after the
inclusion of our covariates. This is in contrast to previous agnostic views taken when using
the Diebold-Yilmaz connectedness measure, which look to examine what events took place
during changes in connectedness, but do not have a way to test the underlying statistical
significance of the events nor deal with a large number of events.
We find that inclusion of these covariates lessens the volatility of net sector return
connectedness, while increasing volatility of net sector price volatility connectedness. For
returns, factors specific to a sector tend to be significant. However, for price volatility,
macroeconomic factors are commonly significant. There do exist some news items which are
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significant for price volatility, but they differ from those that were significant for returns.
Additionally, we see some common news items affect each sector, along with news items
unique to a sector. While we can never explain all factors that underly connectedness, our
approach allows to us to gain insight on connectedness by adding the ability to discuss sig-





Table 11.1: Connectedness Table
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Connectedness table, as given in Diebold and Yılmaz (2014). Each entry dHij gives the
connectedness from j to i, which is analgous to the transpose of the adjacency matrix.
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Table 11.2: Summary Statistics







N = 89, T = 2, 292
Average and standard deviation for each price category across all companies. Last is the last price
of each trading day, Open is the opening price of each trading day, Bid is the last bididng price at
which a trade was completed, Ask is the last asking price at which a trade was completed, High
was highest price for a completed trade on each day, and Low is the lowest right for a completed
trade on each day. All values are rounded to three decimal places.
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Table 11.3: Principal Component Variance Share
Sector Returns Volatilities
Basic Industries 67.91 89.88
Capital Goods 45.45 89.81
Consumer Durables 51.14 79.49
Consumer Non-Durables 46.25 89.33
Consumer Services 33.42 78.77
Energy 52.90 87.28
Finance 49.63 76.29
Health Care 58.88 92.49




Percentage of variance for returns and volatilities captured by the first principal component. All
values are rounded to two decimal places.
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Table 11.4: p-values and Coefficient Sign for Static VARs
Covariate Return VARs Volatility VARs
Basic Industries
News Item
Balance Of Payments .0000000000056+ .
Bankruptcy 0.0132+ .
Credit Ratings 0.0861− .
Exploration . 0.0672+
Government 0.00158− .




Federal Funds . 0.000000646−
Inflation Expectation . 0.0794+
Consumer Sentiment . 0.075−
Unemployment Rate . 0.000716−
Capital Goods
News Item
Acquisitions Mergers . 0.00601−
Assets 0.0975+ .
Credit . 0.0195+
Equity Actions . 0.06+
Indexes 0.00456+ .
Insider Trading 0.0755+ .
Marketing . 0.00876−
Products Services 0.0232− .
Macroeconomic
CPI . 0.0372+
Federal Funds . 0.00036−
Inflation Expectation . 0.0508+
Dollar Index . 0.0832−




Civil Unrest . 0.000934+
Corporate Responsibility 0.0952− .
Equity Actions . 0.0404−
Investor Relations 0.0298+ .
Revenues 0.0347+ .
Macroeconomic
Continued on next page
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Table 11.4 – continued from previous page
Covariate Return VARs Volatility VARs
Federal Funds . 0.000000686−
Inflation Expectation . 0.0748+
Unemployment Rate . 0.0299−
Consumer Non-Durables
News Item
Acquisitions Mergers 0.076+ .




Order Imbalances 0.0782+ .
Macroeconomic
CPI . 0.0134+
Federal Funds . 0.0000747−
Inflation Expectation . 0.0304+
Consumer Sentiment . 0.00387−
Consumer Services
News Item
Acquisitions Mergers 0.0692+ .
Civil Unrest 0.0467+ .
Credit 0.0933− .
Insider Trading . 0.00709−
Labor Issues . .00000193+
Marketing . 0.00428+
Partnerships 0.0152− .






Acquisitions Mergers 0.057− .
Dividends . 0.00553−
Earnings . 0.031−
Insider Trading . 0.0169−
Labor Issues 0.0428+ .
Partnerships . 0.0732+
Price Targets .0000549+ .
Products Services 0.0894− .
Revenues . 0.00934+
Macroeconomic
Continued on next page
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Table 11.4 – continued from previous page
Covariate Return VARs Volatility VARs
CPI . 0.0758+
Dollar Index . 0.0954−
Finance
News Item
Acquisitions Mergers . 0.06−
Assets 0.0944− .
Balance Of Payments 0.0948+ .
Bankruptcy 0.000313+ .
Credit 0.0959− 0.0148+
Labor Issues . 0.0155+
Partnerships . 0.0562−
Regulatory . 0.0246−
Stock Prices . 0.00646−
Macroeconomic
Treasury Rate . .0000117+
GDP 0.072− .
Inflation Expectation . 0.0976−
Dollar Index . 0.051−
Consumer Sentiment . 0.0178−
Health Care
News Item
Credit Ratings 0.048+ .






Treasury Rate . 0.0629+
Federal Funds . 0.00000796−
Inflation Expectation . 0.00965+










Continued on next page
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Table 11.4 – continued from previous page
Covariate Return VARs Volatility VARs
Federal Funds . 0.0012−
Inflation Expectation . 0.0566+
Consumer Sentiment . 0.0962−
Technology
News Item
Acquisitions Mergers . 0.00174−
Equity Actions .0000386+ .
Insider Trading . 0.0894+




Federal Funds . 0.000395−
Inflation Expectation . 0.00273+






Investor Relations . 0.0452−
Transportation 0.0000000247− .
War Conflict 0.00153− .
Macroeconomic
CPI . 0.0469+
Federal Funds . 0.000259−
Inflation Expectation . 0.0807+
Dollar Index . 0.0849−
Consumer Sentiment . 0.0189−
Unemployment Rate . 0.0406−
p-values for covariates in each VAR that were of 10% significance or better. All values are given
to three significant digits. A “.” indicates the value was not significant in the estimated VAR. A
minus sign (−) indicates the sign of the coefficient in the VAR is negative, while a plus sign (+)
indicates the sign of the coefficient in the VAR is positive.
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11.2 Figures
Figure 11.1: CDO Structural Diagram
A typical CDO structure, including tranche percentages. A name would be any underlying asset,
such as a bond, mortgage, etc. SPV is the special purpose vehicle, a corporate entity created
specifically to create CDOs. Peng, Kou (2009)
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Figure 11.2: Average News Measure by Type
Technical Analysis Transportation War Conflict
Revenues Security Stockprices Taxes
Price Targets Product Services Public Opinion Regulatory
Legal Marketing Order Imbalances Partnerships
Industrial Accidents Insider Trading Investor Relations Labor Issues
Equity Actions Exploration Government Indexes
Credit Ratings Crime Dividends Earnings
Bankruptcy Civil Unrest Corporate Responsibility Credit





























































































































































































Average of the weighted sector news measure across all sectors, faceted by type.
38
Figure 11.3: Static Company Return Network Graph
Network graph for returns of 89 companies CDS’s. Communities are detected in Gephi using an
algorithm by Blondel et al. (2008). Each color indicates a community (4 colors total). Size is
indicative of the out-degree of connectedness for each company. The more a company affects all
others, the larger the node. Edges are filtered so top 25% of edges by weight are visible. GVDs
are used to decompose and H-step ahead error is 12.
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Figure 11.4: Static Company Price Volatility Network Graph
Network graph for price volatility of 89 company CDS’s. Communities are detected in Gephi
using an algorithm by Blondel et al. (2008). Each color indicates a community (4 colors total).
Size is indicative of the out-degree of connectedness for each company. The more a company
affects all others, the larger the node. Edges are filtered so top 25% of edges by weight are visible.
GVDs are used to decompose and H-step ahead error is 12.
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Figure 11.5: Distribution of Companies Among Modularities
Technology Transportation
Finance Health Care Public Utilities
Consumer Non-Durables Consumer Services Energy
Basic Industries Capital Goods Consumer Durables






























































Communities (modularities) Blondel et al. (2008) in each static network for company returns and
company price volatility. Each color for a group correspond to the node color in 11.3 and 11.4.
The two groups are not necessarily the same, but represent detected groups in decreasing order of
number of companies of group (0 being the highest, 3 being the lowest).
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Network graph for First Principal Component of company returns by sector (11 sectors total). No
community detection as in Figures 11.3, 11.4. All edges are visible. GVDs are used to decompose
and H-step ahead error is 12.
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Network graph for First Principal Component of company price volatility by sector (11 sectors
total). Communities are detected in Gephi using an algorithm by Blondel et al. (2008), with each
color corresponding to community (2 colors total). All edges are visible. GVDs are used to
decompose and H-step ahead error is 12.
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Diebold-Yilmaz spillover index for returns without sector-specific and macroeconomic covariates.
Average value and maximum and minimum spillover index across all VAR orderings for Cholesky
decomposition are given by the black line and gray ribbon, respectively. 25% and 75% bounds for
the Cholesky Decomposition across 10,000 random permutations are given by the red ribbon.
Index for generalized variance decomposition (GVD) is given by the blue line. Window is 500
days and H-step ahead error is 12.
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Diebold-Yilmaz spillover index for volatilities without sector-specific and macroeconomic
covariates. Average value and maximum and minimum spillover index across all VAR orderings
for Cholesky decomposition are given by the black line and gray ribbon, respectively. 25% and
75% bounds for the Cholesky Decomposition across 10,000 random permutations are given by the
red ribbon. Index for generalized variance decomposition (GVD) is given by the blue line.
Window is 500 days and H-step ahead error is 12.
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Figure 11.10: Range of Net Sector Return Connectedness without Covariates
Technology Transportation
Finance Health Care Public Utilities
Consumer Non-Durables Consumer Services Energy










































Minimum, maximum, and average net connectedness by sector for returns with sector-specific and
macroeconomic covariates, calculated across 10,000 random permutations. Window is 500 days
and H-step ahead error is 12.
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Figure 11.11: Net Sector Return Connectedness without Covariates
Technology Transportation
Finance Health Care Public Utilities
Consumer Non-Durables Consumer Services Energy










































Average net connectedness by sector for returns without sector-specific and macroeconomic
covariates, calculated across 10,000 random permutations. Window is 500 days and H-step ahead
error is 12.
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Figure 11.12: Net Sector Return Connectedness with Covariates
Technology Transportation
Finance Health Care Public Utilities
Consumer Non-Durables Consumer Services Energy










































Average net connectedness by sector for returns with sector-specific and macroeconomic covariates,
calculated across 10,000 random permutations. Window is 500 days and H-step ahead error is 12.
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Figure 11.13: Net Sector Volatility Connectedness without Covariates
Technology Transportation
Finance Health Care Public Utilities
Consumer Non-Durables Consumer Services Energy







































Average net connectedness by sector for volatilities with sector-specific and macroeconomic
covariates, calculated across 10,000 random permutations. Window is 500 days and H-step ahead
error is 12.
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Figure 11.14: Net Sector Volatility Connectedness with Covariates
Technology Transportation
Finance Health Care Public Utilities
Consumer Non-Durables Consumer Services Energy







































Average net connectedness by sector for volatilities with sector-specific and macroeconomic
covariates, calculated across 10,000 random permutations. Window is 500 days and H-step ahead
error is 12.
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Figure 11.15: Spillover Index for Returns without Covariates
H-step, Window Size: 18, 450 H-step, Window Size: 18, 500 H-step, Window Size: 18, 550
H-step, Window Size: 12, 450 H-step, Window Size: 12, 500 H-step, Window Size: 12, 550









































Diebold-Yilmaz spillover index for returns without sector-specific and macroeconomic covariates
across various H-steps and window sizes. Average value across all VAR orderings for Cholesky
decomposition are given by the black line and generalized variance decomposition (GVD) is given
by the blue line
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Figure 11.16: Net Basic Industries Return Connectedness with Covariates
H-step, Window Size: 18, 450 H-step, Window Size: 18, 500 H-step, Window Size: 18, 550
H-step, Window Size: 12, 450 H-step, Window Size: 12, 500 H-step, Window Size: 12, 550






































Average net connectedness for Basic Industries return with sector-specific and macroeconomic
covariates, calculated across 10,000 random permutations and various H-steps and window sizes.
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Figure 11.17: Net Energy Volatility Connectedness without Covariates
H-step, Window Size: 18, 450 H-step, Window Size: 18, 500 H-step, Window Size: 18, 550
H-step, Window Size: 12, 450 H-step, Window Size: 12, 500 H-step, Window Size: 12, 550






































Average net connectedness for Energy volatility without sector-specific and macroeconomic
covariates, calculated across 10,000 random permutations and various H-steps and window sizes.
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